|
Strategic Policy Design for Investment and Financing in Iran's Petrochemical Sector: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
|
Hossein Seilsepoor1   , Payam Barzegar2 |
1- Ph.D., Financial and Banking Department, Faculty of Management and Accounting, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran , seilsepour@atu.ac.ir
2- Ph.D., Strategic Foresight and Management, Futures Studies Group, Faculty of Strategic Management, Supreme National Defense University, Tehran, Iran |
|
|
Abstract: (39 Views) |
This study applies game theory and graph modeling to examine the investment and financing structure of Iran’s petrochemical industry. The main goal is to identify stable equilibrium states among key stakeholders—government, petrochemical holding companies, banks, capital markets, international investors, and the National Development Fund—and to propose strategies for enhancing decision-making efficiency and reducing structural risks. Strategic options were modeled for each actor, and four key equilibrium states (15, 26, 33, and 34) were identified, where no actor can unilaterally improve its outcome. The findings suggest that strategic coalitions, especially among state institutions, financial entities, and the National Development Fund, can lead to more favorable and stable outcomes. Moreover, reverse game analysis shows that modifying rules and designing effective policy incentives can encourage actors to adopt strategies aligned with national development goals. These insights offer valuable guidance for policymakers aiming to improve institutional coordination and promote sustainable investment in the petrochemical sector.
|
|
| Keywords: Petrochemical industry investment and financing, game theory, strategic alliances, reverse game. |
|
|
Full-Text [PDF 789 kb]
(36 Downloads)
|
Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Management
Received: 2025/04/20 | Accepted: 2025/09/2 | Published: 2026/04/30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Send email to the article author |
|
|
|
| Add your comments about this article |
|
|
|
